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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
BUSINESS RECORDS:-
A PARTIAL METAMORPHSIS
By SIDNEY N. LEDERMAN*
Necessity has given rise to a number of exceptions to the Rule against
Hearsay.' The requirements that testimony be given under the sanction of the
oath and subjected to the test of cross-examination have been dispensed with
in situations where the declarant of the words in question is unavailable and
his oral or written statement was made in circumstances which, it can be pre-
sumed, would impress his remarks with a genuinely trustworthy quality. In
many situations such declarations are the only cogent evidence available and
to exclude them would result in considerable injustice. The Courts accordingly
developed exceptions in a haphazard fashion to circumvent the rigidity of the
Hearsay Rule in particular instances.2 Lord Reid in Myers v. Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions,3 described the manner in which these exceptions evolved:
By the nineteenth century many exceptions had become well established, but
again in most cases we do not know how or when the exception came to be
recognised. It does seem, however, that in many cases there was no justification
either in principle or logic for carrying the exception just so far and no farther.
One might hazard a surmise that when the rule proved highly inconvenient in a
particular kind of case it was relaxed just sufficiently far to meet that case, and
without regard to any question of principle. This kind of judicial legislation, how-
ever, became less and less acceptable and when over a century ago the patchwork
which then existed seems to have become stereotyped.4
Although a wholesale rethinking of the Hearsay Rule is necessary and
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
'The Rule provides that written or oral statements, or communicative conduct
made by persons who are not testifying are inadmissible if such statements or conduct
are tendered either as proof of their truth or as proof of assertions implicit therein. The
Rule has been enunciated in a multitude of cases including the following: Dalrymple v.
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, [1966] 2 O.R. 227 at 231, (aff'd by (1967)
60 D.L.R. (2d) 192;) Blackstone v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
[1944] O.R. 607 at 618; Mitchell v. Hanan, [1943] 3 W.W.R. 431; Willoughby-Sumner
Ltd., v. Sumner, [1942] 3 D.L.R. 381; Victoria Mutual Fire Ins., Co. v. Davidson
(1883), 3 O.R. 378; Ferrie v. Jones (1851), 8 U.C.Q.B. 192; Subramanium v. Public
Procecutor, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 at 969; National Fire Insurance Co. v. Rogers, [1924]
2 D.L.R. 403.
2Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule developed in situations where as Master of the
Rolls, Sir George Jessel, stated in Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards (1876), 1 P.D. 154 at
240, the following four characteristics existed: (1) It was impossible or difficult to
secure other evidence; (2) the author of the statement was not an interested party in
the sense that the statement was not in his favour; (3) the statement was made before
the dispute in question arose; (4) the author of the statement had a peculiar means of
knowledge not possessed in other cases.
3 [1965] A.C. 1001, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881.
4Id., at 1020 A.C., at 884 All E.R.
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is taking place in some quarters, 5 today's litigants continue to be plagued,
as were their predecessors in the last two centuries, by the vagaries of the
Hearsay Rule and its multiple exceptions. This note will focus upon the
traditional exception most commonly invoked by the parties - declarations
made in the course of a business duty - and will consider the impact of
recent judicial and statutory reform.
A. The Classical Exception6
The importance of this exception has, for the most part, been super-
ceded by a Federal enactment and legislation in a number of Provinces which
allow for the admissibility of written business documents if certain criteria are
met. Medical reports are also admissible by statute in Ontario, Saskatchewan
and Quebec.7 Although these provisions have taken away much of the force
from this common law exception, it still remains of considerable value in
situations where counsel is faced with the problem of adducing evidence of
an oral statement or where counsel wishes to put in a written business record
which fails to meet the requirements of the relevant statutory provisions. An
examination of the common law rule is therefore in order.
An exception was justified for this class of hearsay statement on the
basis of necessity, the declarant no longer being available to give evidence.8
Moreover, the statement was said to possess a circumstantial guarantee of
truth arising from the fear of the declarant of censure and dismissal should
an employer discover an inaccuracy in the statement and from the fact that
constant routine and habit in making entries provide some likelihood of
accuracy.0
The traditional rule can be enunciated as follows:
Statements made by a deceased declarant under a duty to another per-
son to do an act and record it in the ordinary practice of the declarant's
business or calling are admissible in evidence provided they were made con-
temporaneously with the fact stated and without motive or interest to
misrepresent the facts.10
5 See Murray, The Hearsay Maze: A Glimpse at Some Possible Exits (1972), 50
Can. B. Rev. 1.
OThe structure of this note follows Professor Stanley Schiffs conceptual organiza-
tion of business record materials under three headings: A. The Traditional Common
Law Rule; B. Modem Common Law Rules; C. Statutory Rules: See Schiff, Evidence in
the Litigation Process: A Coursebook in Law. (Draft edition, 1972).
7 These statutory provisions are discussed infra at p.23 et seq.
8 Lefebure v. Worden (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 54.
9Poole v. Dicas (1835), 1 Bing. N.C. 649 at 652.
10 Similar statements appear in Palter Cap Co., Ltd. v. Great West Life Assurance
Co., [1936] O.R. 341 at 357-58, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 304 at 310; in Cross, Evidence (3rd ed.
London: Butterworths, 1967) at 406; in R. Baker, The Hearsay Rule (London: Pitman,
1950) at 78; in J. Tregarthen, The Law of Hearsay Evidence (London: Stephen and
Sons Limited, 1915) at 113.
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(i) The Declarant Must Be Dead
It would be reasonable to believe that in cases where the declarant is not
dead but his unavailability is explained to the satisfaction of the Court, his
evidence would be admitted provided that all the other essential elements
exist. Reason and logic, however, have never permeated this area of the law.
As a condition precedent to the admissibility of the hearsay statement the
declarant must be shown to be dead at the date of trial and no other ground
for his absence is acceptable.'" No clear explanation has been given for this
narrow restriction except that the death of the declarant and the absence of
other evidence makes the admissibility of the statement necessary. It surely
can be said, for the same reason, that other forms of unavailability should be
considered. For example, is the situation any different if the declarant, al-
though not deceased, is afflicted with an insane disease rendering him incom-
petent to testify? Similarly, should the evidence be held inadmissible because
the declarant is out of the jurisdiction or cannot be found after a reasonable
and diligent search had been made? The stamp of trustworthiness impressed
upon the declaration would be no less diminished if it could be shown to the
Court that for reasons other than the demise of the declarant, he is un-
available to testify, and it is impossible or unreasonable to expect the party
to secure his attendance. 12 Although criticism against such a narrow require-
ment can readily be levied, it is so well entrenched that little can be gained
by reiterating its unreasonableness.
(ii) The Duty Must be One to do a Specific Act
and Then Record it when Done
Only those statements which record facts that the declarant is duty-
bound to perform and record in the course of his profession or trade are
admissible. In Palter Cap Co., Ltd., v. Great West Life Assurance Co.'8 the
issue was whether the deceased had deliberately made untrue statements on
an application for an insurance policy by stating that he was in good health
and suffered from no heart ailment. The defendant contended that prior to
making the application the deceased had consulted a heart specialist with
respect to a cardiac problem. In proof thereof, the insurance company ten-
dered records taken from the files of the heart physician, Dr. Murray, who
had died some time thereafter. The records included inter alia:
(a) A written medical history of the deceased patient;
(b) A cardiograph and screen tracing bearing the deceased's name and a
date prior in time to that of the insurance application;
" In National Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers, [19241 2 W.W.R. 186, [1924]
2 D.L.R. 403 and in Cooper v. Marsden (1793), 1 Esp. 1. statements were excluded
because there was no evidence that the declarants were deceased, although they were
clearly unavailable for attendance at trial. Also see Myers v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions, supra, note 3 at 1027-28 A.C., at 889 All E.R.
12 American courts have held that insanity or sickness or the absence of the
declarant from the jurisdiction is sufficient to justify admissibility of the statements: 5
Wigmore, Evidence, ss.1402-1408. Also see Rule 509 of the Model Code of Evidence.
'
8 Supra, note 10. See C.A. Wright, Case Note (1936), 14 Can. B. Rev. 688.
1973]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
(c) A letter by the specialist to the instructing physician again bearing a date
prior to the date of the application and reporting on the examination of
the deceased.
The court was satisfied that these records related to an examination per-
formed by the doctor in the ordinary course of his business and duty and
that the statements were made at or near the time at which the medical
examinations were conducted. Although the nature of the act clearly came
within a physician's business and duty, the court questioned whether the
making of the records and the drafting of the reporting letter were in the
ordinary course of the doctor's business and in pursuance of a duty. Upon
hearing evidence on the obligation or duty of a specialist to furnish a report
to the physician who referred the patient to him, the court conceded that the
specialist was duty bound not only to exercise skill in making the examina-
tion, but he was also under a duty in the ordinary course of practice in the
medical profession, to report the results to the family physician, so that he
might have the benefit of the specialist's diagnosis and opinion in the sub-
sequent treatment of the patient.14 In addition to the reporting letter, Masten
J.A., held that the written medical history, the cardiograph and screen tracing
were admissible upon the following basis:
In the present case it was essential that Dr. Murray should make the investiga-
tions and tests recorded in exhibits (b) and (c) [cardiograph and screen tracing].
He could not make his report unless he did so, and the very act of making these
investigations and tests involved the creation of the records (b) and (c). Using
the words of Vaughan Williams L.J., the making of these examinations and tests
"was therefore a step in obtaining the ultimate result."
For these reasons I am of opinion that exhibits (b) and (c) and (d) [the cardio-
graph, screen tracing and reporting letter] are admissible in evidence. If I thought
that in so deciding I was extending in the smallest degree the ambit of this
exception to the general rule barring hearsay evidence, I would have the greatest
hesitation in so holding, for I fully appreciate the danger of widening the excep-
tion in question.15
The Alberta Court of Appeal in McGillivray v. Shaw"6 held admissible
a memorandum prepared by M's solicitor, since deceased, as a declaration
made in the course of duty to show that the arrangement between M and N
which was in issue in the action was such that M was in possession of land
owned by N, not merely as a tenant of the latter but under an agreement of
sale. The Court held that as M's solicitor, there would be a duty to record
the particulars of the agreement to be used by him at a later time either in
drawing or checking the necessary documents.
14 In Mills v. Mills (1920), 36 T.L.R. 772, Simon v. Simon et al, [1936] P.17, and
in Dawson v. Dawson and Heppenstal (1905), 22 T.L.R., medical reports and histories
made by deceased physicians were excluded because no duty to another in preparing
such documents could be established.
15 Supra, note 10 at 362 O.R. at 314 D.L:R. In Mellor v. Walmsley, [1905] 2 Ch.
164, Romer LJ. in holding admissible an engineer's field book which contained survey
figures and measurements said at 167: "It was his duty to make measurements. He
could not make a plan without taking measurements and he could not discharge his
duty without making these entries."
16 (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 660.
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In Conley v. Conley et al,17 the Ontario Court of Appeal had before
it the question whether notes, made by a private investigator since deceased,
of observations he had made of the respondent and co-respondent, were made
in the ordinary course of business in pursuance of a duty. The evidence re-
vealed that as an employee, the private detective was responsible for making
notes during the course of his investigations and presenting them to his
superior. McKay J.A., in ruling the notes admissible had this to say:
... I am of the view that under the ordinary rules of evidence they are admissible
under the exception to the hearsay rule that entries made in the ordinary course
of business by a person who is later deceased are admissible, provided the con-
ditions of admissibility are met. Those conditions are set out most conveniently
in Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., vol. V, pp. 372-3, s. 1524, and it is stated in
this way:
Its requirements are strict. First, there must have been a duty to do the very
thing recorded. Secondly, there must have been a duty to record or other-
wise report the very thing. Thirdly, the duty must have been to record or
otherwise report it at the time.
As to whether it is in the regular course of business, Wigmore at pp. 370-1, s.
1522 of the same volume, makes this statement:
The entry must have been, therefore, in the way of business. This may be
defined to mean a course of transactions performed in one's habitual rela-
tions with others and as a natural part of one's mode of obtaining a liveli-
hood. It would probably exclude, for instance, a diary of doings kept merely
for one's personal satisfaction; but it would not exclude any regular record
that was helpful, though not essential nor usual in the same occupation as
followed by others. There is, therefore, no special limitation as to the
nature of the occupation.18
The Courts, therefore, will look carefully at the act performed and the
recording thereof to ensure that both fall within the purview of the declarant's
business duty. One, however, must question the rigid prerequisites to the
admissibility of statements under this exception. A better approach would
be to examine the statements and consider the dangers that would result
should they be admitted without their being given under oath and in the
absence of cross examination. In the Palter case, there is little hazard accom-
panying the admissibility of the doctor's report and the medical results upon
which it was based. They were, for the most part, comprised of objective
data and accordingly there was little risk of distortion in the doctor's percep-
tion or memory. Moreover, there was no apparent reason for the specialist
to be insincere particularly when he had nothing to gain and inaccuracy
could be detected subsequently by other physicians. Having regard, therefore,
to these minimal dangers, these documents could rationally be admitted with-
out the court going through an analysis to ascertain whether the doctor had
a duty to both do the act and record it and then report to the instructing
physician. On the other hand, should the courts be so eager to admit the
notes of a deceased private detective, as in Conley, even though they may
'7 [19681 2 O.R. 677, 70 D.L.R. (2d) 352.
18 Id., at 678 O.R., at 353 D.L.R.
1973]
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meet the necessary conditions of the common law exception? Upon a con-
sideration of the hearsay dangers, one has no guarantee that the investigator
was in a position to observe what he recorded or that he actually perceived
what he thought he observed. Furthermore, is there sufficient assurance of
the deceased's sincerity? He was engaged by the petitioner specifically for the
purpose of detecting illicit acts between the respondents with a view to using
this evidence in order to secure a divorce. It was, therefore, to the advantage
of the detective to come forth with a report that would confirm the reason
for his being hired. In light of all these dangers, one should be concerned
with the willingness of Courts to allow in such evidence, untested by cross
examination, merely because it complies with the requirements of the excep-
tion. The Courts have been reluctant, however, to follow a pragmatic line
of reasoning in considering the admissibility of such statements.
The duty in making a record must be one owed to some person other
than to the declarant himself.' 9 It must be more than just the personal custom
of the declarant. Thus in Massey v. Allen,20 an entry made in the day book
of a deceased stockbroker was held inadmissible because the stockbroker had
no duty as between himself and his client to keep such a record. It has also
been held that entries in books kept by a deceased solicitor are inadmissible
under this common law exception if he was under no duty to maintain proper
books21 although the entries could be admissible as declarations against in-
terest. In O'Connor et at v. Dunn,22 notes kept by a deceased surveyor in a
book in which he recorded both private and professional matters which was
tendered in proof of the existence of a boundary between two lots was ex-
cluded on the ground that the surveyor owed no duty to anyone to keep such
notes. In 1827, there was no statutory provision requiring the surveyor to
keep records of his survey work. Nor was there any fixed practice or custom
among surveyors at that time to keep such notes. Burton J. A., expressed the
following view of the surveyor's notes:
... it appears clear upon the cases that the declaration to be evidence must be
confined strictly to the particular thing which it was the duty of the person to do,
and that it must appear not only that it was his duty to do the act, but to make
an entry of it.
... It is, to my mind, a misnomer to call the document offered in evidence "Field
notes." It was a simple entry in Mr. Gibson's diary, made for his own satisfaction
or convenience, and it does not comply with any of the conditions under which
the relaxation of the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence has been
admitted. It is not shewn aliunde that the survey was made, and there was no
obligation cast upon Mr. Gibson to make any entry or record upon the subject;
19 McDonald v. Young (1933-4), 7 M.P.R. 602 at 612, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 172 at 179.
20 (1879), 13 Ch. D. 558, 49 L.J. Ch. 76.
2lBright v. Legerton (1861), 2 De G.F. & 1. 606 at 617; Hope v. Hope [1893]
W.N. 21; Ecroyd v. Coulthard, [1897] W.N. 25; but see contra, Rawlins v. Rickards
(1860), 28 Beav. 370.
22 (1877), 2 O.A.R. 247.
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and if there were, one would scarcely look for it in a memorandum book in
which he entered the ordinary passing events of the day.23
The duty, moreover, must be specific in nature. In Smith et al v.
Blakey,24 an agent of the plaintiff firm of merchants had agreed, on behalf
of the plaintiff, to purchase an order of shoes from a manufacturer. He wrote
the plaintiff a letter advising of the purchase and that he had received "three
huge cases" of shoes from the defendant manufacturer. The agent had died
prior to trial and an attempt was made to introduce the letter as a declaration
made in the course of duty. Although the deceased clerk was under a general
duty to communicate to his principals all business that was transacted at the
branch office, he was under no particular duty to report the receipt of three
cases of shoes and the details surrounding that transaction. Accordingly, the
letter was held inadmissible. The exception is therefore restricted to those
situations in which it was the duty of the declarant to do a specific thing
and to record its performance. In Dominion Telegraph Securities Ltd. v
Minister of National Revenue,25 in proof of a settlement, the appellant ten-
dered evidence of oral statements of negotiations for settlement made by its
deceased secretary-treasurer and general manager to the appellant's solicitor
who was consulted after the alleged settlement for the purpose of making a
distribution of the proceeds of that settlement among the appellant's share-
holders. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this evidence because the
officer's duty to make the statements to the company's solicitor was not
clearly established.26 The settlement having been completed, any statements
made by the deceased corporate officer as to the negotiations and reason for
settlement would not be part of the instructions given to the solicitor with
respect to the disposition of the proceeds. Similarly in Chambers v Bern-
asconi27 a report made by a deceased sheriff's officer which included among
other things the location of an arrest was excluded on the ground that,
although the declarant owed a duty to report the arrest, he was under no
specific duty to the sheriff to record the place where he had arrested the
accused.
23 Id., at 258, 259. Also see McGregor v. Keiller (1883), 9 O.R. 677. Subsequently
the Surveys Act, R.S.O. 1897 c.181, s.40, was enacted to provide that surveyors were
to keep regular field notes and to provide copies to the relevant parties. In Lakefield v.
Brown (1910), 15 O.W.R. 656, 1 O.W.R. 589, Clute, J. held a surveyor's field notes
admissible stating at 660, O.W.R., at 590 O.W.N.: ". . . it was clearly the duty of the
surveyor to make the survey which he did from which to prepare the plan. It was the
original plan of the particular lot. The plan was in fact filed. A portion of the village
was laid out in pursuance of that plan. The field notes form an essential part of the
work which was necessary to be done to make the plan available. As to what was in
fact done could not be fully known except from the field notes. I am strongly inclined
to the view that in this case the notes were admissible."
24 (1867), L.R. 2 Q.B. 326, 36 LJ.Q.B. 156.
25 [19471 S.C.R. 45, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 449.
2 6 In Mercer v. Denne, [19051 2 Ch. 538, a survey of a castle prepared in the
year 1816 was tendered by the defendant in disproof of a claim of custom by fisher-
men to spread their nets to dry on his shore to show that the sea had, within living
memory, covered the land in question. The survey was excluded because it could not
be clearly established whether the surveyor was or was not under a duty to prepare the
document.
27 (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. 347.
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(iii) The Act Must Have been Completed
The statement must relate to acts which have been performed. It will
be excluded if it refers to an act to be done at some future time even though
it is to be performed in pursuance of a duty. A statement of intention to
perform an act offers no guarantee that the act was in fact subsequently per-
formed. Thus in Rowlands v. De Vecchi,28 a record kept by a deceased clerk
in postage books setting out letters to be posted was excluded when tendered
to prove that a certain letter had been mailed.29
(iv) The Act Must Have Been Performed By The Declarant Himself
James L. J., in Polini v. Gray30 indicated that not only was it a pre-
requisite that the declarant possess personal knowledge of the act, but that
he must have performed it or taken an active part in it:
... The principle has never been questioned in any case, and it is this, that it
must be an entry, not of something that was said, not of something that was
learned, not of something that was ascertained, by the person making the entry,
but an entry of a business transaction done by him or to him, and of which he
makes a contemporaneous entry. For nothing else was it admissible, and it was
received only because it was the person's duty to make that entry at the time when
the transaction took place. The exception is entirely confined to that:31
In Brain v. Preece32 it was held that the deceased declarant's recording of
the weights of coal given to him by an employee was insufficient to render
his records admissible. They could be admitted only if the declarant had
weighed the coal himself.33
(v) The Statement Must Have Been Made Contemporaneously with The Act
This is a condition which has been laid down by a number of cases. 34
Although absolute contemporaneity is not required, the declaration must be
28 (1882), 1 Cab. & E. 10
29 But see contra, R. v. Buckley (1873), 13 Cox C.C. 293 in which a report, made
by a police officer to his superior that he was proceeding to a particular location to
observe the accused, was admitted as evidence that the murdered police officer and the
accused had met each other at that place. This case, however, was not considered by
the Court in the Rowlands case and appears to be of doubtful authority.
30 (1879), 12 Ch. D. 411.
31 Id., at 426. Quoted with approval by Bowen L.. in Lyell v. Kennedy (1886),
56 L.T. 647 at 657 and by Estey J., in Dominion Telegraph Securities Ltd., v. Minister
of National Revenue, supra, note 25 at 62 S.C.R. at 463 D.L.R.
32 (1843), 11 M. & W. 773.
38In The Henry Coxon (1878), 3 P.D. 156 at 148, Sir Robert Phillimore in
rejecting log entries by a deceased sailor relating to a collision at sea said, "Entries in
a document made by a deceased person can only be admitted where it is clearly shown
that entries relate to an act or acts done by the deceased person and not by third
parties." The sailor's entries included the movements of the other ship as well as his
own and were therefore inadmissible.
34 Doe v. Turford (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 890 at 898; Barton v. Dundas and Parsons
(1865), 24 U.C.Q.B. 273; O'Connor et al v. Dunn, supra, note 22 at 259, 261 et seq.,
Polini v. Gray, supra, note 30 at 425, 430; Mercer v. Denne, supra, note 26 at 558;
Re Diambie Rubber Estates Ltd. (1912), 107 L.T. 631; Hart v. Toronto General Trusts
(1920), 47 O.I.R. 387.
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"made at or about the time of the transaction." 35 Each case turns on its
own circumstances; in Price v. Torrington,36 the act of delivering beer was
performed in the morning and a record thereof made in the evening and it
was held that there was sufficient contemporaneity; in The Henry Coxon37
and in Re Djambie Rubber Estates Ltd.,38 however, a hiatus of two days and
one month, respectively, in recording the fact rendered the statements inad-
missible; in McGillivray v. Shaw,39 the memorandum prepared by the solicitor
was admissible even though it was not contemporary with the original agree-
ment of purchase and sale but made "immediately after" the agreement was
confirmed. Vaughan Williams L. J., in Mercer v. Denne40 stipulated that
the entry must be proved to be the last step in a continuous chain of duty.
Thus, the Courts have not been prepared to allow a wide latitude in time
between the doing of the act and making a report of it. The test is quite
strict as any guarantee of accuracy necessarily dissipates with the passage
of time. Accordingly, the declaration must be made within such time after
the act as to be part of it.
Contemporaneity is not a precondition to the admissibility of declara-
tions against interest though its absence may affect the weight to be attrib-
uted to them. No apparent reason can be traced for its requirement as a
condition precedent to admissibility of declarations in the course of duty,
but not declarations against interest. There appears to be no sound reason
for maintaining the distinction and may best be resolved by making it a
factor going to weight alone.
(vi) The Declarant Must Not Have any Motive or Interest to Misrepresent
It has been held that the declarant must have been disinterested in the
statement and had no motive to misstate the act or transaction that took
place.41 Johnson J.A. in McGillivray v. Shaw,42 found as one of the bases for
admitting the deceased solicitor's memorandum that as it was made for his
own use at a later date to draft the formal documents, he had no interest in
misstating the facts which he was setting out. In Conley v. Conley,43 how-
ever, as has been pointed out,44 the notes of a private investigator were
admitted, notwithstanding he was engaged by one party to the litigation to
gather evidence against the other. In those circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that the declarant was entirely without motive or interest to mis-
represent the facts in his notes or report.
35 Per Burton, J.A. in O'Connor et at v. Dunn, supra, note 22, at 259.
own circumstances; in Price v. Torrington,36 the act of delivering beer was
36 (1703), 1 Salk. 285.
3 7 Supra, note 33.
38 Supra, note 34.
39 Supra, note 16.40 Supra, note 26 at 558.
41 Polini v. Gray, supra, note 30 at 430; The Henry Coxon, supra, note 33; Hart
v. Toronto General Trusts, supra, note 34.
42 Supra, note 16.43 Supra, note 17.
44 See text, infra at p.9.
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Lack of motive is not a matter going to the admissibility of declarations
against interest. Again, there is no logical foundation for its preservation as
a condition precedent to the admissibility of only declarations in the course
of duty. The arbitrary distinction should be removed and if the declarant
is shown to possess a motive to fabricate or distort, it should go to the weight
of the statement.
(vii) Collateral Matters are Inadmissible
Another point of difference between this exception and declarations
against interest is that unlike the latter,45 collateral facts in a statement are
not admissible. Only that part of the statement which is in fact made in the
course of duty is admissible. Extraneous matters accompanying that declara-
tion are excluded. 40 In issue in Johnston v. Hazen41 was the marital status
of the father of the claimant at the time of his first marriage. In proof thereof,
entries in the register kept by the rector of St. Paul's were tendered. Barker
J., rejected the entries as being collateral and not coming within the rector's
duty to record. He stated:
... if it was the duty of the rector of St. Paul's, in marrying these persons, to
make a record of it in accordance with the extract from Bacon which I have just
cited, and if in discharge of that duty he did make the entry, the register is evi-
dence of the fact which it was his duty to record in it. That fact is, the marriage
of the parties; not whether the man was a bachelor or a widower. That is a
collateral statement, unimportant so far as the act of marriage which the rector
was to perform under the license is concerned, and of which he was to make an
entry in the register. 48
There is no reason for maintaining the rule that facts collateral to a
statement made in the course of duty should be excluded. The guarantee
of trustworthiness which justifies the reception of declarations made in the
course of duty equally applies to collateral statements which naturally accom-
pany the narrative.
B. Emergence of a New Judicial Rule
A strict adherence to the traditional common law exception often leads
to anachronistic results as in the case of Myers v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions.40 In that case, the accused were charged with conspiracy to receive
stolen cars and to defraud the purchasers of the stolen cars. In order to prove
its case, the Crown wished to show that the numbers on the cylinder blocks
of the cars corresponded with the numbers contained in the car manu-
4 5 Higham v. Ridgway (1808), 10 East. 108; Homes v. Newman, [19311 2 Ch. 112
at 121; McDonald v. Young, supra, note 19 at 613-14, M.P.R. at 180 D.L.R. Polak
v. Polak (1963), 41 W.W.R. 160 at 172, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 333 at 344.
46 Chambers v. Bernasconi, supra, note 27, Polini v. Gray, supra, note 30.
47 (1905), 3 N.B. Eq. 147.
48d., at 162.
40 [1965] A.C. 1001, [1964] 3 W.L.R. 145, [1964] 2 All. E.R. 881. In Canada,
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal rejected the evidence of the business records of an
automobile manufacturer made by unascertained persons in National Fire Insurance Co.
v. Rogers, [1924] 2 D.L.R. 403.
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facturer's records which were entered by employees as the cars left the as-
sembly line. The House of Lords held that such records were inadmissible
as hearsay and failed to come within any of the recognized exceptions. The
court indicated that the tenet of the Hearsay Rule has been firmly established
for the better part of two centuries and although fresh exceptions were
judicially created in the nineteenth century, the creation of any new excep-
tions in the twentieth century were to be left to the legislators and not to the
courts. If, however, it could have been proven that the original makers of
the record were dead, their record would have been admissible under the
traditional common law rule as a declaration made in the course of a busi-
ness duty.
How important a fact, in the context of the Myers case, was the failure
to show that the declarant was dead at the time of trial? In deciding that the
evidence of the records was inadmissible, the House of Lords did not con-
sider which of the hearsay dangers, if any, were present. No analysis was
made as to how the evidence might be received and yet afford some measure
of protection to the accused.
If the court had allowed the business records to go in, what hearsay
dangers would have resulted? Was there any danger of fabrication on the
part of the workmen who entered the numbers in the records? Surely there
was no deliberate insincerity on their part as they had no interest in making
false entries. They made these records when the cars were first manufactured,
and accordingly, there was no real risk of fabrication. Thus, cross examina-
tion of the workmen would not in all likelihood have disclosed any insincerity.
Could there have been faulty perception on the part of the workmen?
It is possible, perhaps, that an employee could have mistaken a "3" for an
"8"; however, cross examination could never have disclosed this deficiency.
Furthermore, the House of Lords ignored the fact that these business
records formed the best evidence available. Had the original workmen been
found, their evidence would have been no better than the record itself. Their
testimony would have been dependent entirely upon the business record
itself, one of hundreds they would have made, and their personal appearance
in court as witnesses would have no effect whatsoever on the validity of that
record. Thus, having the workmen present for cross examination would have
added nothing to the proceeding. So, in the Myers case, there existed a situ-
ation where the hearsay evidence posed few, if any of the customary dangers,
and the protection for the accused and the guarantee of trustworthiness of
the evidence would not have been improved if the original declarants were
called to testify. Nothing was to be gained by barring the hearsay evidence.
Moreover, the House of Lords ignored the question of necessity. How
could the Crown ever locate the workmen who made the original records? In
the modern-day world of giant corporations, there is the problem of anony-
mously prepared records. Considerations of necessity and convenience dictate
the admissibility of such business records.
Aware of these criticisms, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ares v.
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Venner,ro in the absence of any statutory provision, chose not to follow the
decision in the Myers case and indicated an acceptance of the reasoning of
the minority in that case, when it allowed in nurses' notes in a malpractice
suit against a physician without the necessity of the original makers of the
notes being called as witnesses.
This judicial reform of the common law exception makes sense for a
number of reasons. First, there is the consideration of mercantile convenience.
To call all the persons responsible for keeping a record in a large institution
is too inconvenient and may in fact serve to disrupt the business of that
institution by taking a multitude of witnesses away from their work. Secondly,
one must consider the expense to the litigants in seeking out and subpoenaing
all relevant witnesses. Thirdly, the cost to the public should be considered
and the great length of time that will be consumed at trial by the testimony
of all the witnesses called merely to prove a business record. Fourthly, with
records of a hospital, involving the health of patients, it can be taken for
granted that nurses, guided by the highest motives, will make every effort
to keep accurate notes.a1 The nurses have no interest, apart from their duty,
in keeping the notes and therefore, in all likelihood, it is an impartial and
trustworthy record of the patient's condition. Furthermore, no advantage
results by calling the nurses themselves. In all probability they will have no
independent memory apart from the notes that they made, and therefore,
the notes as evidence are superior to the testimony of the nurses. All of these
factors give rise to a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness which justifies
the reception of the document without the necessity of calling the declarants.
The innovative decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ares v.
Venner is admirable in opening the road of admissibility to allow in business
records which do not fall under the umbrella of the traditional common law
exception. In so doing, however, one must ask whether the Court has gone
one step too far. It claims to have adopted the minority opinion in the Myers
case. There is, however, a major distinction between the two cases. The
records kept in the Myers case (and in Omand v. Alberta Milling Co.52 and
Ashdown Hardware Co., v. Singer et al,53 and Canada Atlantic Railway Co.,
v. Moxley,54 which were referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada) all
dealt with situations where the declarant merely recorded data that was
presented to him. It amounted to no more than a transcription of numbers
and other mathematical or monetary data. In making such a record, the
declarant did not have to interpret what he observed. His opinion or inter-
pretation was not material as he merely had to copy the results of a test or
other scientific or technical material. In Ares v. Venner, however, the nurses
were not just recording the objective data of blood pressure or pulse rate;
they were observing the condition of the patient and interpreting his condition
in a subjective way. The notes stated at times that the patient was "blue", or
50 [1970] S.C.R. 608, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4.
51 See Horn v. Sturm (1965), 408 P. 2d. 541 at 549.
52 [1922] 3 W.W.R. 412, 18 Alta. L.R. 383.
53 (1951), 33 W.W.R. (N.S.) 145.
54 (1889), 15 S.C.R. 145.
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"blueish pink", or "cool", or "cold". Unlike the Myers case, these records
give rise to the spectre of hearsay dangers. The nurses' perception, observa-
tion and interpretation may have been subject to error. The opponent has
lost his opportunity to cross examine on the nurses' ability to perceive and to
interpret accurately what they saw. It is suggested that the records which are
based on such subjective factors do not stand on the same footing as the
manufacturer's records of numbers in the Myers case. It is one thing to allow
in objective business records where it is too inconvenient to call the declarant.
It is another matter entirely to extend this to business records which turn
greatly on the declarant's ability to perceive. Mr. Justice Hall thought that
it was a sufficient safeguard to the opponent who wishes to challenge the
accuracy of the nurses' notes, that he can call the nurses to the stand him-
self. The nurses were present in the courtroom during the trial and thus were
available to be called as witnesses by the opponent. But, does this afford a
sufficient protection against the hearsay dangers? If the opponent calls them
to testify, how can he cross examine them? They are his witnesses and thus
he can only examine them in chief unless they show hostility in their
demeanour on the stand by being evasive or generally unresponsive to the
questions put to them. That does not allow counsel to properly test the
nurses' perception.
What if the nurses were not available in the courtroom for examination?
Would the Supreme Court of Canada still have adopted the minority decision
in the Myers case and applied it to the nurses' records which were dependent
upon subjective criteria? Are the hearsay dangers eliminated only because
the declarants were in the courtroom and could be examined by opposing
counsel?
In C.P.R. v. City of Calgary,55 the appellate division of the Alberta
Supreme Court applied Ares v. Venner to admit business records where the
makers thereof were not readily available. In an action by the railway against
the City for damages resulting from a train derailment caused by the collapse
of a culvert constructed under the track by the City, the court admitted a
summary of facts and figures extracted from the business records of the rail-
way which it tendered on the question of damages to show which cars were
destroyed. Unlike the Ares v. Venner case, the data recorded in the document
was purely objective. It still remains an open question as to whether the
decision in Ares v. Venner will be applied to situations where the declarant
is not only not available, but his record is substantially subjective in nature.
In any event, the Supreme Court of Canada has trodden where no Eng-
lish court has. It ignored the admonition of the majority opinion in the Myers
case that it is for the legislature, not the courts to extend the common law
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule to admit business documents. The minority
in the Myers case would have allowed in business records because of the
anonymity of the makers of the records and the impossibility of tracing them.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Ares v. Venner did not even think that un-
5 [1971] 4 W.W.R. 241.
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availability of the declarant was a necessary precondition to the admissibility
as the nurses were not only identifiable but were available in the courtroom.
The decision in Ares v. Venner, though important to those Provinces
which have no statutory provision with respect to the admissibility of busi-
ness records, has had little practical impact in those Provinces which have
enacted legislation to circumvent the narrow scope given by the traditional
common law exception. One qualification, however, is necessary here. As
will be seen, the provincial legislation does allow in hospital records. But
quaere whether this provision sanctions the admissibility of hospital records
which contain not only the objective data of temperature, pulse rate, etc.,
but the impressions and diagnostic opinions of doctors and nurses? If they
do not, then in this context, Ares v. Venner may still be of relevant and prac-
tical importance in those Provinces which do have business record statutes.
C. Admissibility By Statute
In order to obviate the difficulties of adducing evidence of business
records under the narrow, traditional common law exception, the legislatures
enacted, in a piecemeal fashion, provisions which facilitated the admission of
particular documents and records without the attendant disruption of, or
interference with the commercial, business or governmental world. Thus,
banking records, letters patent, foreign judgments of certain jurisdictions,
copies of statutes, official gazettes, ordinances, regulations, proclamations,
journals, orders, appointments to office, notices thereof and other public
documents purporting to be printed under the authority of the United Kingdom
Parliament, or of the English government, or by or under the authority of
the government of any legislative body of any state within the Dominions,56
were made admissible without any necessity of calling the makers of the
documents.
The culmination of this legislative reform has been the business record
provisions modelled on comparable American enactments. 57 Under these
statutes, business records of a great variety are now admissible;58 but, a close
examination of the various provisions reveals serious limitations to the scope
5  See Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.E-10, sections 19-24, 26-29, 32 and
The Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.151, sections 25-30, 32, 34, 39-42.
5
rThe Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. c.E-10, s.30, and the Evidence Acts of British
Columbia, R.S.B.C., 1960, c.134 as amended by S.B.C., 1968, c.16, s.43a, New
Brunswick R.S.N.B., 1952, c.74 as amended by S.N.B. 1960, c.29, s.42A, Nova Scotia
R.S.N.S., 1967, c.94, s.22, Ontario, R.S.O. 1970, c.151, s.36, and Saskatchewan,
R.S.S. 1965, c.80, as amended by S.S. 1969, c.51, s.30a.
58 " .. This section would cover such diverse things as, perhaps, pages and pages
of stockbrokers' dealings with a client, pages and pages of a credit company's business
affairs, perhaps pages and pages of records of one of the big stores in the com-
munity . . . .": Per Morand, J. in Aynsley et al v. Toronto General Hospital, [1968] 1
O.R. 425 at 431, 66 D.L.R. (2d) 575 at 581. In Re Brown; Gordon v. Rosenberg
(1968), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 17, Registrar Cook admitted as business records, (1) docu-
ments of the bankrupt, possession of which were taken by the trustee pursuant to his
statutory duty, and (2) all records prepared by the trustee in performance of his
statutory obligations.
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of admissibility. In Ontario, section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act is the
relevant provision and it provides as follows:
36.-(1) In this section,
(a) "business" includes every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling,
operation or activity, whether carried on for profit or otherwise;
(b) "record" includes any information that is recorded or stored by means of
any device.
(2) Any writing or record made of any act, transaction, occurrence or event
is admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event if made in
the usual and ordinary course of any business and if it was in the usual and
ordinary course of such business to make such writing or record at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(3) Subsection 2 does not apply unless the party tendering the writing or
record has given at least seven days notice of his intention to all other parties
in the action, and any party to the action is entitled to obtain from the person
who has possession thereof production for inspection of the writing or record
within five days after giving notice to produce the same.
(4) The circumstances of the making of such a writing or record, including
lack of personal knowledge by the maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but
such circumstances do not affect its admissibility.
(5) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of any evidence that
would be admissible apart from this section or makes admissible any writing or
record that is privileged.
It should be noted that although the wording of the section is cast in
broad terms so as to encompass practically every type of writing utilized in
connection with any operation,59 whether it be profitable or not, two criteria
must be met as preconditions to admissibility:
1. The record must have been made in the usual and ordinary course of busi-
ness; and
2. It was in the usual and ordinary course of the business to make such
writing. 0
It is the latter qualification which severely restricts the type of documents
that may be admitted; for, notwithstanding that documents may be made
in the usual and ordinary course of business, if it is not the business
custom of the activity or operation to maintain such a record, they are in-
59 In Watkins Products Inc. v. Thomas (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 252, 51 M.P.R.
321, the Appeal Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court, however, in inter-
preting the phrase in the New Brunswick provision, "a record or entry of an act, condi-
tion or event made in the regular course of a business" held that it did not include
monthly statements of account or invoices. It said that the entry or record had to be
in a book of account or something similar to it or related to it such as an employee's
time card. The Ontario statute includes "any writing" and therefore may not be subject
to such a restricted interpretation.
6o The Evidence Acts of British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan also
impose these two criteria. In New Brunswick, the record need only be shown to have
been made in the "regular course of a business". Another requirement of admissibility
is that the record be qualified by a witness who can testify that these two criteria have
been fulfilled, or, in New Brunswick, that the document was made in the "regular
course of a business": Aynsley et al v. Toronto General Hospital, supra, note 58 at
434 O.R. at 584 D.L.R.; Watkins Products Inc. v. Thomas (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d)
252, (1965), 51 M.P.R. 321
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admissible. An American case is illustrative of this point. In Palmer v. Hoff-
man,01 the Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to consider these
two criteria in a Federal provision worded similarly to the Ontario enactment.
That was an action arising out of a railroad crossing accident in which the
defendant tried to put in as evidence, a statement made by the deceased train
engineer to some officials at the defendant's freight office. Although the en-
gineer's report of the accident was a record made in relation to his employ-
ment, the court held that that was insufficient for the purposes of admissibility
under the statute. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the court, stated that in
order to come within the business records statute, it must be shown to be a
record which is necessary for the systematic and mechanical conduct of the
business as a commercial enterprise. It must be a record that is routinely
kept to run the business as a business. Most businesses are concerned about
prospective litigation, and therefore, have a practice of taking statements
from employees when an accident occurs. The primary purpose of such a
document, however, is to assist in the lawsuit and not to assist in the running
of the railway business. The court was fearful that there would be abuse
should it allow in the report in question. The court speculated that a business
could thereby introduce self-serving evidence, i.e., the statements which
reflect its version of the accident. Such documents have nothing to do with
the day-to-day operation and management of the railroad business. The
trustworthiness of business documents is based on the reliability placed on
such records by the commercial world. In the absence of routineness, there
exists the danger that the maker of the record may not be motivated to be
accurate. It is the mercantile nature of the record which attracts trustworthi-
ness, not just the fact that the document was prepared in the regular course
of business. The implied introduction into business record legislation of the
factor that there be no motive to misrepresent is consistent with the require-
ments of the traditional common law exception. 62 Because there is scarcely
any business record which could avoid exclusion on this ground, it may be
best to give the Court power to inquire into the circumstances of the record
making, and to exclude it only if the self-serving nature of the document
would indicate a serious lack of trustworthiness. 63
It could be argued that, even within the court's strict definition of the
business record section, the train engineer's report was admissible on the
ground that it is within the railroad's business as such to investigate mishaps
and to record observations in order to improve and ensure the efficient run-
ning of trains. Moreover, in the United States, the railroad has to deliver
monthly reports of accidents to the appropriate governmental agency setting
forth the nature and causes of the accidents and accordingly, it could be said
that the engineer's statement relates in substance to the operation of the rail-
road as a business enterprise. 64
61 (1943), 318 U.S. 109, 63 S. Ct. 477.
62 See text, infra at p.14.
63 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (1973), R.
803(6).
64 (1910), 36 Stat. 350, (1940), 45 U.S.C., §38.
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In Otney v. United States,65 the issue was whether certain documentary
diagnostic evidence of the accused's mental competency could be introduced
by the prosecution under the Federal business record statute to establish the
accused's sanity. The United States Court of Appeals, while acknowledging
that the statute was to be interpreted broadly, held the document inadmissible
on the ground that the statute was never intended to apply to written psy-
chiatric opinion made for purely evidentiary purposes. The purpose of the
accused's mental examination was not for treatment or cure, which is the
normal business of a hospital, but solely to enable psychiatrists to inform the
Court whether he was fit to stand trial. It was therefore found to be outside
the regular course of the hospital's business. Even in situations where the
hospital report has been prepared for both a 'business' and litigation purpose,
it will be excluded. In Horn v. Sturm,6 there were two reasons for the
preparation of an autopsy report: (1) to obtain information which would be
helpful in the treatment of future patients and (2) to obtain information
useful in prosecuting or defending a damage action. The Court held the
report inadmissible in the malpractice action because one of the reasons for
its preparation was for use in litigation.
The commercial aspect of the document as it relates to the business is
therefore paramount. In view of the fact that no Canadian court has, as yet,
interpreted these provisions of the Ontario statute, the American cases are
consequently instructive in this area.
Another notable feature of the Ontario provision is that it contemplates
the admissibility of a record based upon hearsay. Subsection 3 makes it clear
that lack of personal knowledge by the maker of the record will not affect
the admissibility of the document, although it may go to the question of
weight. Thus, a record based upon information given to the maker is never-
theless admissible. This provision, however, may not necessarily receive a
broad interpretation from the courts. Although no Canadian court has dealt
squarely with the point, the New York Court of Appeal's decision in Johnson
v. Lutz, 67 may be indicative of things to come. In the Johnson case, which was
an action arising out of a motor cycle accident, entries contained in a police
officer's report were held to be inadmissible on the ground that they were
not based upon the officer's personal knowledge but upon information given
to him by a bystander. The court held that the police report did not fall
within the New York equivalent of section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act,
notwithstanding the explicit provision contained in the New York statute to
the effect that
All other circumstances of the making of... [the] record, including lack of per-
sonal knowledge of the entrant or maker.. .shall not affect its admissibility.
The court held that the police report of the accident was not a record
made in the regular course of business in the sense that the legislature in-
tended. The report was based on statements made voluntarily to the police
65 (1965), 340 F. 2d 696.
66 Supra, note 51.
67 (1930), 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517.
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officer. The party informant was under no duty to make a statement to the
police officer. To come within statutory provision, the court held that it
had to be shown that not only the maker of the record was acting pursuant
to a business duty, but that the person from whom he received the informa-
tion, was acting under a business duty as well. It is the business element of
the record which gives it credence and efficacy. Without it, the purpose of the
legislation is lost. The reliability of the record turns on the maker's duty to
make the entry and upon the duty of the informant to give the information
to the maker. Neither the New York statute nor section 36(4) of The
Ontario Evidence Act preclude the maker of the record from relying on
hearsay information. He need not have first hand personal knowledge of the
fact that he is recording. It can be based on the information given to him by
others; but, in light of Johnson v. Lutz, it could be said that the informant
must be under a business duty to impart that information to the maker. The
Court therefore has read into the statute a condition not expressly contained
in it. Both the statement and its basis must be made entirely in the course
of business, the rationale being that little assurance of trustworthiness can
be given to reports based upon information supplied voluntarily and casually
by an individual unrelated to the business.0 8
Unless there is some guarantee of reliability in the particular circum-
stances, the general practice of allowing in business records based on hearsay
is inherently dangerous. It is submitted, however, that the wording of section
36(4) is explicit and has taken heed of the weakness of multiple hearsay.
The legislature expressly stated that such weakness was to go to the question
of weight alone and not to admissibility. In the few decisions that have in-
volved section 36, Ontario courts, however, have shown a propensity to
follow the rationale in Johnson v. Lutz rather than the literalness of the
provision.
In Adderly v. Bremner, 9 Brooke J., held that only that part of the
hospital record which relates to occurrences taking place in the hospital and
routinely recorded are admissible, but not that part of the record which
relates to occurrences or events taking place prior to admission to the hos-
pital and recorded as part of the case history. He stated
... I do not think that the intention of the legislature was to permit a plaintiff to
prove his case by introducing as proof of the truth of its content, the history that
may be amongst the hospital records - being a history that the plaintiff or some
other person had recounted on the plaintiffs admission to or while in hospital.
Nor do I think it was the intention of the legislature to open to a plaintiff a means
of escaping the test of truth through cross examination by resort to the hospital
history record.70
8 But see Simpson v. Lever, [1962] 3 All. E.R. 870 where Winn J., admitted a
police officer's book containing an unsigned statement of an unavailable witness under a
differently worded English provision. Most of the American authorities have confirmed
the principle in Johnson v. Lutz: See Gencarella v. Fyfe (1948), 171 F. 2d. 419; Gordon
v. Robinson (1954), 210 F. 2d. 192; Standard Oil Co. v. Moore (1957), 251 F. 2d
188, cert. denied 356 U.S. 975; Yates v. Blair Transport Inc. (1965), 249 F. Supp. 681.
09 [1968] 1 O.R. 621, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 274.
70 ld., at 623 O.R. at 276 D.L.R.
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Thus, notwithstanding sub-section 4, the court ruled inadmissible self-serving
statements made by a patient to his doctor and recorded in a hospital note.
The case suggests that such statements by the patient do not fall within the
purely business nature of hospital treatment and thus the decision in Adderly
v. Bremner is consistent with Johnson v. Lutz.
Are such statements so unreliable as to warrant exclusion, even in the
face of the clear words of section 36(4)? It has been urged that the maker
of the statement has a motive to falsify and he should not be allowed to have
such evidence admitted under the guise of business records without any test
of cross examination. In Northern Wood Preservers Ltd., V. Hall Corp.
(Shipping) 1969 Ltd., et al,7' Lacourciere, J. excluded an entry in a log
book which was tendered as a business record under section 36 of The On-
tario Evidence Act, because, notwithstanding it was made contemporaneously
with the event and in pursuance of a duty to record, there may have been
present some motive to misrepresent. Yet the Ontario Court of Appeal has
not considered the motive to misrepresent too great a hazard in admitting
business records under section 36 in other areas. In Conley v. Conley,72
for example, the notes of the private investigator as to observations of the
adulterous conduct of the respondents were admissible under section 36 of
The Ontario Evidence Act, notwithstanding they were prepared for and
tendered on behalf of the party litigant. Are such records any more reliable
than hospital records containing self-serving statements by patients? Or, for
that matter are the latter any the less trustworthy than medical reports pre-
pared on behalf of a party litigant which are admissible specifically under
section 52 of The Ontario Evidence Act? With respect to all of those reports,
the record was prepared in situations where there existed the possibility of a
motive to misrepresent. They are not records merely setting out objective
data of a business nature. They were made either for the purpose of litigation
or at a time when litigation was foreseeable and contemplated.
To be consistent, and in view of section 36(4), which specifically states
that the hearsay content of a business record does not render it inadmissible,
then hospital records containing statements of the patient should be admis-
sible as well. Although the hospital record relates to matters extraneous to
the business of running a hospital, (i.e., the cause of the injury), these matters
are important to the administration of medical care to the patient. Informa-
tion provided by the patient as to the cause of injury is required in the
diagnosis and treatment of the injury, and that is the very business of a hos-
pital. In Melton v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,73 the Supreme Court of
Missouri held admissible under a comparable business record statute a hos-
pital record containing statements describing the cause of the accident in
which the patient was injured. In so doing, the court expressed its conclusion
in this way:
The hospital wanted to know how the patient got hurt. This was helpful to the
hospital because it aided in determining the nature and extent and proper treat-
71 [19721, 3 O.R. 751, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 413.
72 Supra, note 17.
73 (1952), 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W..(2d) 663.
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ment of the plaintiff's injury. The patient stated how he got hurt: The statement
was recorded for the apparent purpose of furthering the hospital's business of
determining the nature and extent and proper treatment of the injury; and the
record of the statement was apparently made by someone of the hospital staff
who presumably, in the circumstances of the recording, had no occasion to falsify
the record. The record was surely of something - an act, condition or event - in
the regular course of the hospital's business. 74
In addition, the Bremner case would exclude hospital records which
contain subjective data such as a doctor or nurse's diagnosis, opinion or
impression, on the ground that they do not constitute "an act, transaction,
occurrence or event", within the meaning of the words in section 36.75 The
court's concern was, presumably, that the subjective opinion of doctors and
nurses based on their perception and not being subject to cross examination,
are not as trustworthy as the recording of purely objective data. This is
particularly true of psychiatric opinions and thus reports of this nature are
not admissible under section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act. As indicated
by Morand J., in Aynsley v. Toronto General Hospital,"6 section 36 con-
templates the admissibility of records containing only objective facts:
... that would mean such routine entries in a hospital record as the date of
admission, the time of admittance, the name of the attending physician, the
routine orders as to the care of the patient, such as the administration of drugs,
notation by the nurse of taking temperatures.. 77
In this context, the result in Adderly v. Bremner should be compared with
the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ares v. Venner. The sub-
jective opinions of doctors and nurses contained in hospital records are in-
admissible under section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act, according to the
Bremner case, but admissible at common law according to the Ares case.
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a business record statute in Ontario,
the decision in Ares v. Venner is of considerable practical importance.
The debate as to whether medical opinions, as opposed to hospital
records, and particularly, medical opinions prepared by a doctor for a party
74 Id., at 671 S.W.
75 American Federal courts have been ambivalent in interpreting records of an
"act, transaction, occurrence, or event". Some have preferred a narrow interpretation so
as to exclude medical diagnoses and prognoses: New York Life Insurance Co., v. Taylor
(1945), 147 F. 2d 297; England v. United States (1949), 174 F. 2d. 466; Lyles v.
United States (1957), 254 F. 2d. 725, cert. denied 356 U.S. 961; Skogen v. Dow Chem-
ical Co. (1967), 375 F. 2d. 692. Others have liberally admitted diagnostic records:
Reed v. Order of United Commercial Travellers (1941), 123 F. 2d. 252; Buckminister's
Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1944), 147 F. 2d. 331; Medina v. Erickson
(1955), 226 F. 2d. 475; Thomas v. Hogan (1962), 308 F. 2d. 355; Glawe v. Rulon
(1960), 284 F. 2d. 495. State courts, for the most part, have admitted such entries:
Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co. (1938), 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d. 224; People v.
Koklmeyer (1940), 284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E. 2d. 490; Wees v. Wees (1947), 147 Ohio
St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d. 245; Allen v. St. Louis Public Service Co. (1956), 365 Mo. 677,
285 S.W. 2d. 663. The Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
effective July, 1973, adopts the view of liberal admissibility by expressly including
"opinions or diagnoses" in addition to "acts, events, conditions".
76 Supra, note 58, varied on other grounds, [1969] 2 O.R. 829, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 193,
aff'd by S.C.C., (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 241.
77 Supra, note 58, at 432 O.R., at 582 D.L.R.
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specifically for the purposes of litigation, comes within section 36 of The
Ontario Evidence Act is now just academic because section 52 of The On-
tario Evidence Act expressly makes such opinion admissible without calling
the doctor to the stand. That provision reads as follows:
52-(1) Any medical report obtained by or prepared for a party to an
action and signed by a legally qualified medical practitioner licensed to practise
in any part of Canada is, with the leave of the court and after at least seven
days notice has been given to all other parties, admissible in evidence in the
action.
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party to an action is entitled to
obtain the production for inspection of any report of which notice has been given
under subsection 1 within five days after giving notice to produce the report.
(3) Except by leave of the judge presiding at the trial, a legally qualified
medical practitioner who has medically examined any party to the action shall
not give evidence at the trial touching upon such examination unless a report
thereof has been given to all other parties in accordance with subsection 1.
(4) Where a legally qualified medical practitioner has been required to give
evidence viva voce in an action and the court is of opinion that the evidence
could have been produced as effectively by way of a medical report, the court
may order the party that required the attendance of the medical practitioner to
pay as costs therefore such sum as it considers appropriate.78
Under section 52, medical reports are admissible with leave of the
court.7 9 Thus, an opponent can object to such an order and demand that the
party call the doctor to give oral testimony and therefore, be subject to cross
examination. If the opponent requires the attendance of the doctor need-
lessly, and the court is of the opinion that the evidence could have been given
as effectively by just putting in the medical report, the court may penalize
that party in costs. This statutory provision is instrumental in saving both
time and monetary expenditure of physicians and litigants. Although it is
clear that such medical reports may contain subjective data and interpreta-
tion by way of diagnosis and prognosis, if the report contains statements that
were made by the patient to the doctor as to how the accident occurred, such
statements are not admissible under section 52.80 It would be improper for
the doctor to relate a statement made to him by the patient as to the cause
of his injury if the doctor took the stand. It is no less admissible because it is
contained in a medical report.
7 8 R.S.O. 1970, c.151. Similar provisions are found in the Saskatchewan Evidence
Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.80, as amended by S.S. 1969, c.51, s.30B; Quebec Code of Civil
Procedure, S.Q. 1965, 13-14 Eliz. II, Vol. II, c.80, amended by S.Q. 1968, 17 Eliz. II,
c.84, s.294a.
79 This section has been considered by Ontario courts in the following cases: De
Genova v. De Genova, [1971] 3 O.R. 304, 20 D.L.R. (3d) 264 (failure to give a
medical report does not necessarily render a physician's oral testimony at trial inadmis-
sible;) Snyder et al v. Siutters, [1970] 3 Q.R. 789, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 173 (a physician
may be called as a witness in addition to the filing of his report); Her v. Beaudet,
[19711 3 O.R. 644 (the medical report to be given to the opposite party as a precondi-
tion to the doctor testifying at trial must substantially disclose the evidence that the
doctor will give orally.)
8OKapulica v. Dumancic, [19681 2 O.R. 438. De Genova v. De Genova, supra,
note 79.
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It was held in Re Brady Infants8l that medical reports may be adduced
in lieu of oral testimony in child welfare proceedings but only under strictly
controlled conditions.8 2 Those conditions were not met in the Brady case
because the psychiatric reports in question, which suggested that the adopt-
ing parents were incapable of meeting the physical and emotional needs of
the children whom the Children's Aid Society were seeking to make wards
of the Society, were based entirely on hearsay without the benefit of any
interviews with the mother. The report was therefore rejected.
Legislation similar to the Ontario business record provision, has been
enacted by Parliament, but with a few major differences. The relevant pro-
vision contained in the Canada Evidence Act is as follows:
30. (1) Where oral evidence in respect of a matter would be admissible in a
legal proceeding, a record made in the usual and ordinary course of business that
contains information in respect of that matter is admissible in evidence under
this section in the legal proceeding upon production of the record.
Under the Canada Evidence Act, the only major condition of admissibility
is that the document be made in the usual and ordinary course of business.
It does not contain the second condition as found in section 36 of The On-
tario Evidence Act that it is in the usual and ordinary course of such business
to make such a record. Thus a train engineer's report of an accident as in
Palmer v. Hoffman,aa for example, may be admissible under the Canada
vidence Act if it were applicable, whereas it would be inadmissible under
The Ontario Evidence Act.8 4 Although the train engineer's report would be
made in his usual ordinary course of business, it may not have been the
usual and ordinary course of business of the railroad to make such documents.
Nor is there any specific requirement of contemporanity in the Canada
Evidence Act. It need not have been a business practice to make the record
in question at the time of the act or transaction or within a reasonable time
thereafter as is required by section 36(2) of the Ontario Act. Section 30(6)
of the Canada Evidence Act gives the trial judge discretion, however, to
enquire into the circumstances surrounding the making of the record for the
purpose of determining whether it should be admissible, or for the purpose
of determining the probative value, if any, to be given to the information
contained in the record.
Furthermore, unlike section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act, there is no
reason to believe that section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act will sanction
records based on information provided by others. Note that the opening words
of section 30 read,
Where oral evidence in respect of a matter would be admissible in a legal
proceeding...
81 [1970], 2 O.R. 262, 10 D.L.R. (3d) 432.
82But Wright I., in De Genova v. De Genova, supra, note 79, in obiter stated
that he did not think s.52 of the Evidence Act applied to exclude oral testimony in
proceedings other than "actions".
83Supra, note 61.
8 Section 30(10) of the Canada Evidence Act, however, might preclude its ad-
missibility if the report was made in the course of an investigation or inquiry.
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The statute merely provides a method of proof of an admissible fact. It does
not make the document admissible when oral testimony of the same fact
would be inadmissible. Thus, if the maker of the record took the witness
stand, he could not testify as to what someone else told him. That would be
inadmissible as hearsay and the same limitation applies to business records
under section 30 of the Canada Act. The Federal provision does not have
a sub-section similar to section 36(4) of The Ontario Evidence Act which
states that a lack of personal knowledge does not affect the admissibility of
the business record.
Section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act makes a record of "any matter"
admissible, whereas The Ontario Evidence Act admits a record of any "act,
transaction, occurrence or event". It could be argued, therefore, that by using
the more general word, "matter", the Canada Evidence Act contemplates the
admissibility of records which contain opinion and other subjective data.
Another major distinction between the Federal and provincial provision
centres on the requirement of notice. Both section 30(7) of the Canada
Evidence Act and section 36(3) of The Ontario Evidence Act provide that
the party who intends to introduce the business record must give his op-
ponent seven days' notice of his intention to do so and the opposite party
has the right of inspection of the record within five days thereafter. Under
both Acts, notice is a condition precedent to admissibility. Under section
30(7) of the Canada Evidence Act, such notice, however, may be dispensed
with by an order of the court. If the record is simple and not detailed, the
court may well exercise its statutory discretion and make an order allowing
for the admission of the business record notwithstanding the absence of
notice if it feels that the opposite party will not be severely prejudiced as
a result of such lack of notice. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note
that The Ontario Evidence Act gives no similar discretion to the trial judge
to dispense with notice. Thus, under section 36 of The Ontario Evidence Act,
no relief is available to the proponent of a business record if he fails to give
the requisite notice, in which case he must resort to calling as witnesses, the
persons who made the actual entries on the record. Both statutes are silent as
to the form of notice to be given, but it is clear that the notice should con-
tain a sufficient description of the record to be tendered so that the opposite
party is informed of the precise documents to be submitted.
Unlike The Ontario Evidence Act, the Canada provision in sub-sections
(3) and (4) takes into account the modem business practice of transcribing
the contents of an original business record on to computer tapes and cards
and other consolidating forms of record storage. Thus, if the record to be
tendered as evidence is in a form different from the original record and as
a result requires an explanation, a transcript of the explanation of the record
may be submitted to the court if it is prepared by a person qualified to make
the explanation and accompanied by his affidavit setting forth his qualifica-
tions to make the explanation and attesting to its accuracy. The Canada
Evidence Act contemplates the admissibility of a copy of a record where it
is impossible or not reasonably practicable to produce the original record,
in which case the copy must be accompanied by an affidavit setting out the
1973]
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reasons why the original record cannot be produced and setting out the
source from which the copy was made and attesting to its authenticity.
Sub-section 2 of section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act expressly pro-
vides for a negative inference which the court can draw from the absence of
relevant information in the record and may conclude that the matter which
was not recorded, did not occur or exist. No similar provision exists under
The Ontario Evidence Act, but it appears that there is nothing to prevent
a trial judge from drawing such an inference.
D. Conclusion
Thus at the present time, counsel faced with the problem of adducing
a business record must consider the viability of each segment of the tripartite
authority permitting the introduction of business records. Since each head of
admissibility has its own limitations, a counsel who is unable to buing his
record within one, may find that another offers a convenient vehicle to
admissibility.
